The Power of a Presumption: California as a Laboratory for Unauthorized Immigrant Workers’ Rights by Griffith, Kati L
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
2-2017 
The Power of a Presumption: California as a Laboratory for 
Unauthorized Immigrant Workers’ Rights 
Kati L. Griffith 
Cornell University, kategriffith@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Labor 
Relations Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Power of a Presumption: California as a Laboratory for Unauthorized 
Immigrant Workers’ Rights 
Abstract 
In recent years, California has served as the primary laboratory for policy experimentation related to 
unauthorized immigrant workers’ rights. No other state, to date, has advanced comparable policy 
initiatives that preserve state-provided workers’ rights regardless of immigration status. Through close 
examination of two open Supremacy Clause questions under California’s Agricultural Labor Relations Act, 
the article illustrates that states can, as a constitutional matter, and should, as a policy matter, serve as 
laboratories for unauthorized immigrant worker rights. Exploring the outer boundaries of state action in 
this area is particularly compelling given the significant labor force participation of unauthorized 
immigrants in low-wage jobs in the United States, given the disproportionate labor rights violations 
experienced by this population and given thirty years of federal legislative inaction on comprehensive 
immigration reform. 
Keywords 
California, immigrant workers, immigrant workers' rights, labor rights, immigration reform 
Disciplines 
Immigration Law | Labor and Employment Law | Labor Relations 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
© UC Davis School of Law. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
Suggested Citation 
Griffith, K. L. (2017). The power of a presumption: California as a laboratory for unauthorized immigrant 
workers’ rights [Electronic version]. UC Davis Law Review, 50(3), 1279-1322. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1145 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2910621 
  
 
1279 
The Power of a Presumption: 
California as a Laboratory 
for Unauthorized Immigrant 
Workers’ Rights 
Kati L. Griffith* 
In recent years, California has served as the primary laboratory for 
policy experimentation related to unauthorized immigrant workers’ rights. 
No other state, to date, has advanced comparable policy initiatives that 
preserve state-provided workers’ rights regardless of immigration status. 
Through close examination of two open Supremacy Clause questions 
under California’s Agricultural Labor Relations Act, the article illustrates 
that states can, as a constitutional matter, and should, as a policy matter, 
serve as laboratories for unauthorized immigrant worker rights. Exploring 
the outer boundaries of state action in this area is particularly compelling 
given the significant labor force participation of unauthorized immigrants 
in low-wage jobs in the United States, given the disproportionate labor 
rights violations experienced by this population and given thirty years of 
federal legislative inaction on comprehensive immigration reform.  
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INTRODUCTION 
State and local efforts to prohibit the employment of unauthorized 
immigrant workers have proliferated1 and have come under intense 
constitutional scrutiny.2 In the last five years, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has twice engaged in Supremacy Clause analyses to consider whether 
federal immigration law conflicted with, and thus preempted, state 
initiatives to curb unauthorized immigration through workplace-based 
regulations.3 
In both Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting and Arizona v. United 
States, the Court acknowledged the federal government’s broad power 
in the area of immigration4 but allowed some state regulation. For 
example, the Court upheld Arizona’s law suspending employers’ 
licenses to do business when employers knowingly employ 
unauthorized immigrants.5 
These court battles — both involving laws passed by the State of 
Arizona — and the scholarship grappling with them, focus on the 
relationship between federal immigration law and state initiatives 
 
 1 See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG., REPORT ON 2015 STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS 8 (Feb. 
3, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/report-on-2015-state-immigration-
laws.aspx (reporting that states enacted twenty immigration-related laws in 2015 that 
targeted employment issues). 
 2 See Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of 
McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 155 (2012) (referencing proliferation of 
subfederal laws “targeting so-called illegal immigrants”); Kati L. Griffith, Discovering 
“Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at 
Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 390-92 (2011) [hereinafter Discovering 
“Immployment” Law]. 
 3 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497, 2518-19 (2012) (“To address 
pressing issues related to the large number of aliens within its borders who do not 
have a lawful right to be in this country, the State of Arizona in 2010 enacted a statute 
[S. B. 1070],” which states its purpose as to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry 
and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the 
United States.”); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 600, 
607 (2011) (“Arizona hopes that its law will result in more effective enforcement of 
the prohibition on employing unauthorized aliens.”).  
 4 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498, 2510 (referring to the federal government’s “broad, 
undoubted power over the subject of immigration . . . .”); Whiting, 563 U.S. at 588, 
611 (acknowledging that the power to regulate immigration is a federal power). 
 5 Whiting, 563 U.S. at 609-11 (concluding that federal immigration law did not 
conflict with Arizona’s licensing law or mandatory E-Verify requirement for 
employers). Cf. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (striking down many aspects of the law but 
rejecting facial challenge to Arizona’s requirement that state officials “conduct a[n] 
[immigration] status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or 
after a detainee has been released”).  
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aimed at reducing unauthorized immigration to the United States.6 
While it is clear the federal government has plenary power to regulate 
immigration, it is not clear how far a state can go to influence 
immigration patterns through welfare, criminal and employment laws. 
As Juliet Stumpf has elucidated, federal immigration law’s recent 
encroachment into areas of traditional state action have blurred 
constitutional boundaries.7 
This article examines the relationship between federal immigration 
law and state initiatives on the other side of the policy spectrum: state 
efforts that seek to protect, rather than penalize, unauthorized 
immigrant workers and their authorized counterparts. As this article 
will reveal, states have wider constitutional latitude in this area than it 
might seem initially. Whiting and Arizona reviewed various types of 
state-level regulations that touched on state interests, but focused on 
reducing unauthorized immigration. In contrast, state efforts to reduce 
immigration effects on state-provided worker protections emanate 
more exclusively from the states’ significant police power interests in 
providing protections for workers. Thus, a powerful presumption 
against preemption is at play and Supremacy Clause jurisprudence 
instructs courts not to preempt these initiatives unless the federal 
government expressed a clear intent to do so.8 
 
 6 See, e.g., Leticia Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, 
93 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1557 (2015) [hereinafter “Wrongfully” Documented Worker] 
(arguing that state identity theft laws that affect immigration regulation “are arguably 
unconstitutional”); Mark S. Grube, Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton: Reconciling Local Enforcement with Federal Immigration 
Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 392-95 (2010) (focusing on subfederal attempts to 
limit employer hiring of the unauthorized); Christopher M. Sherwood, Comment, 
Threading the Needle: State Immigration-Related Employment Laws Surviving a Federal 
Preemption Analysis, 12 WYO. L. REV. 253, 254 (2012) (focusing on the preemption of 
state immigration laws); Jaime Walter, Comment, Congressional Preemption of Work-
Authorization Verification Laws: A Narrower Approach to Defining the Scope of 
Preemption, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 289, 289-90 (2010) (focusing on the preemption of state 
immigration laws). 
 7 See Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1602 (2008) (“[S]tate laws that attempt to 
influence the movement of noncitizens us[e] traditional state police powers over 
employment, welfare, and crime. These laws raise tensions between the outward-
looking justifications for federal control over immigration law — uniformity in foreign 
policy and the border-centered role of the federal government in defining the national 
identity — and the domestic role of the states in exercising their police powers. Now 
that federal immigration law has invaded those traditional areas of state concern, there 
is friction with the constitutional preemption rule reserving governance of 
immigration law to the federal government.”). 
 8 There is only one circumstance where federal immigration law expresses a clear 
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While Arizona has been at the forefront of state-level laws intended 
to reduce unauthorized immigration, California has been at the 
forefront of state-level attempts to ameliorate the ways that a worker’s 
immigration status can negatively affect the state’s enforcement of 
worker protections. For instance, California in 2002 passed a law that 
explicitly made an employee’s immigration status “irrelevant” to the 
state’s enforcement of state-provided labor and employment 
protections.9 More recently, in 2013, California law made it illegal for 
an employer to threaten to report an employee’s immigration status in 
response to an employee’s attempt to enforce his or her state-provided 
worker rights. Such an act now constitutes “immigration-related 
retaliation” in violation of California law.10 
The scope of states’ ability to serve as laboratories of unauthorized 
immigrant workers’ rights involves the interaction between federal and 
state regulatory spheres. It also implicates the sometimes 
complementary, sometimes contradictory, relationship between 
immigration and employment regulation. Indeed, immigration and 
employment regulation have become so interconnected in some areas 
that the author has written extensively on the emergence of a new 
hybrid area of law — “immployment” law.11 
Most notably, a 2002 Supreme Court decision raised a number of 
questions about the relationship between immigration and 
employment regulation. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, the 
Court considered whether the National Labor Relations Act’s 
(NLRA’s) lost wages (backpay) remedy was available to an 
unauthorized employee who experienced a federal labor law violation 
when he was fired for engaging in union organizing.12 The Hoffman 
Court held the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) could not 
award backpay to this unauthorized employee, who had violated the 
 
intent to preclude states from providing a protection to an unauthorized immigrant 
worker who experiences a violation of state workplace law — states cannot require 
employers to reinstate unauthorized employees back into their jobs as a remedy for 
the violation as that would directly conflict with federal immigration law’s 
requirement that employers do not knowingly employ unauthorized immigrants. See 
Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 497, 505 (2004) (explaining that courts cannot order reinstatement of an employee 
that is not legally entitled to work in the U.S.). 
 9 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3339(b) (West 2016). 
 10 S.B. 666, 2013 Leg. Serv., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
 11 See, e.g., Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law, supra note 2, at 405; Kati L. 
Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and 
Employment Law, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 128-29 (2009).  
 12 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140-41 (2002).  
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Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) by using fraudulent 
documents to gain employment.13 In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court noted that providing backpay to an unauthorized employee in 
this circumstance would condone the employee’s prior immigration 
law violations and encourage future immigration law violations.14 This 
decision gave birth to myriad immployment law questions about federal 
immigration law’s effects on state efforts to provide labor and 
employment protections, regardless of a worker’s immigration status. 
To take a deep dive into this complex tangle of regulatory 
interactions, this article focuses on one case study in particular: the 
scope of California’s ability to protect the collective action rights of 
unauthorized immigrant workers in agriculture. Agriculture is a 
strategic focal point as it is the sector with the highest concentration of 
unauthorized workers. By some estimates, California is home to one-
fourth of the population of unauthorized immigrants nationwide.15 
The U.S. Department of Labor estimates that in fiscal years 2010–
2012, sixty percent of California’s hired crop workers were 
unauthorized immigrants.16 
There are several open Supremacy Clause questions about federal 
immigration law’s effects on California’s ability to protect the 
collective action rights of unauthorized immigrant farmworkers 
through its Agricultural Labor Relations Act (CALRA) of 1975.17 
Unlike national labor law passed during the New Deal era, CALRA 
granted some of the nation’s most exploited workers, farm laborers, 
with rights to engage in many forms of workplace-based collective 
activity to try to improve their working conditions free of employer 
retaliation.18 
 
 13 Id. at 148-49. 
 14 Id. at 151. 
 15 SENATE RULES COMM., SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 666, 2013 Reg. Sess., at 5-6 
(Cal. 2013) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb_666_cfa_ 
20130423_090638_sen_comm.html. 
 16 DANIEL CARROLL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL 
AGRICULTURAL SURVEY, tbl. 1 (1989–2012). 
 17 See generally Herman M. Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 — 
La Esperanza de California para el Futuro, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783 (1975) 
(describing the political context that gave rise to the CALRA); Maria L. Ontiveros, 
Forging Our Identity: Transformative Resistance in the Areas of Work, Class, and the Law, 
33 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2000) (arguing “farm workers need unions because 
they suffer from low pay, deplorable working conditions, racialized and gendered 
exploitation, intentional pitting of workers against each other, depending upon their 
ethnicity, and oversupply of labor spurred by statute”). 
 18 The Agricultural Labor Relations Act’s “Declaration of Policy” provides: 
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Part I of the article will describe the specific open Supremacy Clause 
questions under CALRA19: namely does IRCA forbid California (1) 
from providing unauthorized farmworkers with lost wages for the 
period after the employer discovers an employee’s unauthorized 
immigration status to remedy an employer’s CALRA violation and (2) 
from limiting the effects of an employer’s private inquiries into 
immigration status during CALRA enforcement proceedings? 
Part II will describe the proper Supremacy Clause analytical 
framework for addressing these questions. It will highlight the need to 
specify the particular nature of the state’s police powers at issue when 
engaging in Supremacy Clause analysis. It will also note the 
importance of gauging Congress’ intent to the extent that it is possible 
as well as the degree of tension necessary for courts to find that federal 
law impliedly preempts state law. 
Parts III and IV will apply the Supremacy Clause analytical 
framework to the two specific preemption questions described in Part 
I. Part III will highlight the strength of California’s police powers 
interest in the area of reducing immigration status effects on state-
provided workplace protections in general, and in particular in the 
area of agricultural relations. Part IV will demonstrate that federal 
immigration law does not express an intent to restrict a state from 
ameliorating the ways that immigration status negatively affects its 
ability to enforce protections for all workers in its state. It will make 
the case that, if anything, state attempts to reduce immigration status 
effects on worker rights helps, rather than hurts, federal policy 
 
It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of California to encourage and 
protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, and to be free 
from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their 
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection. For this purpose this part is adopted to provide for 
collective-bargaining rights for agricultural employees.  
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140.2 (Deering 2016); see Cal. Legislature, ASSEMBLY DAILY J., May 
20, 1975, at 31-32, http://clerk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/ 
archive/DailyJournal/1975/Volumes/756133e.pdf (stating that Gordon Duffy “voted in 
support of SB 1 [CALRA] since in my opinion it is essential that we resolve the 
problem of employer–employee relationships in agriculture”). 
 19 This article focuses on IRCA preemption questions, as those are the questions 
arising from recent developments. It does, however, make reference to reasons why 
the NLRA does not preempt CALRA in Part III. 
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interests in reducing incentives for employers to hire unauthorized 
workers. 
Through close examination of two open Supremacy Clause 
questions under California’s Agricultural Labor Relations Act, the 
overall aim of the article is to illustrate that states can, as a 
constitutional matter, and should, as a policy matter, serve as 
laboratories for unauthorized immigrant worker rights. Exploring the 
outer boundaries of state action in this area is particularly compelling 
given the significant labor force participation of unauthorized 
immigrants in low-wage jobs in the United States and given thirty 
years of federal legislative inaction on comprehensive immigration 
reform. 
I. OPEN SUPREMACY CLAUSE QUESTIONS UNDER CALRA 
Before describing the specific Supremacy Clause preemption 
questions related to CALRA, a brief primer on Supremacy Clause 
analysis is in order. The Supremacy Clause communicates that federal 
law is “supreme”20 and preempts state regulation that conflicts with 
federal law. Congressional intent is the ultimate touchstone of all 
Supremacy Clause or preemption analyses.21 To determine whether 
Congress intended to preempt state regulatory initiatives, the Court 
has developed four different types of preemption analyses. As this Part 
will elaborate upon, there are three types of preemption analyses that 
are not relevant here: express preemption, field preemption and 
impossibility preemption. The open questions under CALRA that will 
be discussed in subsequent Parts of the article involve the fourth type 
of preemption analysis: implied obstacle preemption. 
The first category of preemption analysis instructs that federal law 
expressly preempts state law when it flatly states that it intends to 
supersede state law.22 IRCA has an express preemption provision, but 
that provision only prohibits state and local (“subfederal”) laws that 
impose sanctions on employers who employ unauthorized workers 
and exempts licensing-type laws from its reach.23 State labor and 
 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 21 Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks 
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
 22 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
 23 IRCA’s express preemption provision “preempt[s] any State or local law 
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) 
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized 
aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012). This provision is silent about its intended 
effects on state workplace rights for unauthorized immigrants. See Madeira v. 
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employment laws do not impose sanctions on employers for 
employing unauthorized workers. Instead, they impose legal 
obligations on employers for violating state labor and employment 
laws vis-à-vis their authorized and unauthorized employees. Thus, 
express preemption is not applicable to the circumstances at issue in 
this article because IRCA’s plain language says nothing about its 
intended effects on workplace protections for unauthorized 
immigrants who fall within a state’s definitions of “employee.” 
In the second preemption category, referred to as field preemption, 
federal law trumps state law in an implied manner when it covers a 
regulatory field so extensively that courts interpret this as an implied 
message that states are not welcome. Field preemption is not at issue 
either because federal law by no means blankets the entire regulatory 
field of workplace protections for unauthorized immigrant workers. 
The third and fourth categories of preemption analyses relate to 
scenarios when courts can imply that the federal law preempts state 
law due to a conflict between federal and state law. In the third 
category, federal law forecloses state law when it is impossible to 
simultaneously comply with state and federal law (“impossibility 
preemption”). In the fourth situation, federal law preempts state law 
when the state law stands “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”24 (“obstacle 
preemption”). 
As the next subsection will discuss, impossibility preemption is not 
an issue here because it is possible for an employer to comply with 
IRCA’s prohibitions against employing unauthorized immigrants and 
to comply with CALRA requirements to pay lost wages to remedy a 
CALRA violation. Thus, the primary preemption framework at issue in 
the article, which will be further fleshed out in Part II, relates to 
implied obstacle preemption. 
A. Can California Provide Unauthorized Farmworkers with Lost Wages 
to Remedy an Employer’s CALRA Violation Regardless of 
Immigration Status? 
Given the description of the Hoffman decision in the Introduction a 
reader may ask: If backpay for unauthorized employees is not available 
in the national labor law context because it may conflict with federal 
 
Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 231-32 (2006) (discussing IRCA’s 
preemption provision and recognizing that it “is silent . . . as to its preemptive effect 
on any other state or local laws”). 
 24 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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immigration law, then why might it be available in the state 
agricultural labor law context?25 The applicability of Hoffman’s 
analyses to the state law context is limited because the U.S. Supreme 
Court was not constrained by the more deferential Supremacy Clause 
analytical lens and the presumption against federal preemption of state 
law.26 Instead, the Court was interpreting two federal laws (IRCA and 
the NLRA) in order to avoid a potential tension. As Part II will 
elaborate upon, when considering IRCA’s effects on state-provided 
workplace protections, Supremacy Clause jurisprudence requires 
courts to presume that the state law is valid unless Congress’ intent to 
preempt the state law is “clear and manifest.”27 
A 2014 case from California’s highest court, Salas v. Sierra Chemical 
Co., also illustrates the open backpay question under CALRA.28 In 
Sierra, the court addressed whether an unauthorized employee, who 
experienced a violation of California’s protections against employment 
discrimination based on disability could receive lost wages to remedy 
his employer’s state law violation. It found Hoffman immaterial 
because it had not applied a Supremacy Clause analytical framework 
to the issues. It held that California could award lost wages for the 
period before the employer learned of the employee’s unauthorized 
status. It also held, however, that federal immigration law preempted 
 
 25 It is again important to note that while there is an open question about federal 
immigration law’s impact on state-provided lost wages remedies, it is undisputed that 
federal immigration law preempts states from issuing a reinstatement remedy when 
unauthorized immigration status is known. Such a remedy would require an employer 
to hire an unauthorized worker to the job he or she held prior to an illegal dismissal. 
As the article will outline in Part IV, such an act would be in direct conflict with 
federal prohibitions against an employer’s knowing employment of unauthorized 
workers. See infra Part IV.  
 26 See Hoffman Plastic Compound, Inc., v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147-48 (2002). 
California’s highest court also viewed Hoffman as an inapplicable case because it did 
not involve the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Salas v. Sierra Chem. Co., 327 P.3d 797, 
804-05 (Cal. 2014). Some have argued that Hoffman should have considered an 
“implied repeal” framework to consider the relationship between federal labor law and 
federal immigration law and that its failure to do so makes it inapplicable to implied 
preemption analysis. See, e.g., Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and 
Illegal Immigration: How Implied Repeal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman 
Plastic, Its Predecessors and Its Progeny, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 53-55 (2008). 
 27 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (noting that the Court 
will “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to 
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress”) (quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 715 
(1985)). 
 28 Salas, 327 P.3d at 800.  
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California from awarding lost wages for the period after the employer’s 
“discovery” of the employee’s unauthorized immigration status.29 
Focusing on impossibility preemption, Salas erroneously concluded 
that it was impossible for the state to award lost pay to an 
unauthorized employee for the period after the employer’s discovery of 
the employee’s immigration status without a direct conflict with 
federal immigration law. In the Salas court’s words: 
any state law award that compensates an unauthorized alien 
worker for loss of employment during the post-discovery 
period directly conflicts with the federal immigration law 
prohibition against continuing to employ workers whom the 
employer knows are unauthorized aliens.30 
This conclusion falsely assumes that requiring an employer to pay 
lost wages for the post discovery period “would impose liability” on an 
employer “for not performing an act . . . expressly prohibited by 
federal law.”31 In this way, the Salas court’s impossibility preemption 
analysis conflated an employer’s payment of lost wages (not expressly 
prohibited by IRCA) with an employer’s employment of that 
individual (expressly prohibited by IRCA). 
Nothing in IRCA’s language prohibits an employer from paying 
wages to an unauthorized employee for work they did not perform 
(lost wages) in order to remedy that employee for the employer’s 
violation of state labor and employment law. IRCA sanctions 
employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized immigrants,32 requires 
that employers verify the work authorization status of its employees33 
and sanctions employees who gain employment through the use of 
fraudulent documents.34 
Consistent with the view that the lost wage remedy does not conflict 
with IRCA, courts have widely agreed that IRCA does not prohibit 
employees from getting lost wages under state health and safety laws 
to remedy a past injury.35 In contrast, IRCA would prohibit 
 
 29 Id. at 803. 
 30 Id. at 807. 
 31 Id.  
 32 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 33 Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A).  
 34 Id. § 1324c(a). 
 35 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc., No. A15-1183, 2016 WL 
3129352, at *1-2 (Minn. Ct. App. June 6, 2016) (holding “the Immigration Reform 
Control Act (the IRCA) does not prohibit an undocumented worker from receiving 
workers’ compensation benefits under the Act”). See generally Oliver T. Beatty, 
Comment, Workers’ Compensation and Hoffman Plastic: Pandora’s Undocumented Box, 
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unauthorized workers from getting their job back, reinstatement, and 
unemployment insurance benefits because they are solely connected to 
the acquisition of future work, rather than remedying a workplace 
injustice that occurred in the past. 
Simply stated, the impossibility doctrine does not apply because it is 
possible for an employer to follow federal law (and not knowingly 
employ an unauthorized employee) and to provide state labor and 
employment law remedies to an employee regardless of employer 
knowledge of immigration status.36 The Supreme Court has 
consistently expressed that impossibility preemption is applicable only 
when compliance with both federal law and state law “is a physical 
impossibility.”37 
What is left open, and will be examined further on in this article, is 
the question of whether the provision of backpay to an unauthorized 
immigrant worker after the employer discovers immigration status 
stands as an obstacle to federal immigration law purposes or 
enforcement mechanisms. 
B. Can California Limit the Effects of Employer Inquiries into 
Immigration Status During CALRA Enforcement Proceedings? 
To what extent can California limit the effects of employer inquiries 
into immigration status during worker protection enforcement 
proceedings without running afoul of federal immigration law? 
California’s 2002 law, referenced in the Introduction and discussed 
further in Part III, forbids an employer from using the formal 
discovery process to make inquiries about an employee’s immigration 
status unless the employer shows “clear and convincing evidence that 
this inquiry is necessary in order to comply with federal immigration 
law.”38 California’s 2013 immigration-related retaliation protections 
restrict employers from threatening to notify immigration authorities, 
from requesting different identification documents from some workers 
 
55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1211, 1214 (2011) (“[T]he application of Hoffman Plastic in 
workers’ compensation cases is misplaced and perversely incentivizes employers to 
both further violate immigration laws by employing undocumented workers and 
ignore workplace safety standards, endangering both legal residents and the 
undocumented claimants.”). 
 36 For a pre-Salas and Hoffman CALRB case finding no actual conflict with federal 
law, see Rigi Agric. Servs., 11 A.L.R.B. No. 27, at 15-17 (1985). 
 37 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012); Fla. Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). 
 38 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3339(b) (West 2016); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1171.5(b) (West 
2016). 
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and from doing more than the federal immigration verification 
requirements mandate. 
These state statutes express an intent to reduce immigration status 
effects on state-provided protections for workers. They do not, 
however, explicitly speak to the question of what kinds of private acts 
employers may engage in to discover immigration status during 
enforcement proceedings. Salas did not address this issue either. By 
distinguishing between the period before an employer discovers 
immigration status, pre-discovery, and the period after the employer 
discovers immigration status, post-discovery, however, the Salas court 
has given employers heightened incentives to “discover” immigration 
status. 
Thus, a lurking issue is the extent to which the California 
Agricultural Labor Relations Board (CALRB), which is the agency in 
charge of enforcing CALRA, can limit the effects of private employer 
inquiries into immigration status. To what extent does federal 
immigration law limit the CALRB’s ability to disregard the relevance of 
immigration status or, depending on the facts, find that an employer’s 
inquiries into immigration status were done in retaliation for the 
enforcement of the worker’s rights? 
The CALRB has not yet directly confronted the question of the 
extent to which it can limit employer inquiries into immigration status 
during enforcement proceedings, although it has raised the issue in 
dicta. In its 2015 California Artichoke and Vegetable Corp. v. Hernandez 
decision, the CALRB bifurcated the unfair labor practice and 
compliance proceedings in a case allegedly involving unauthorized 
immigrant employees.39 The charging parties claimed that the 
employer committed an unfair labor practice when it disciplined 
workers for leaving the job site because of unsafe working 
conditions.40 The CALRB reserved the question of whether the 
employer’s hiring of a private investigator to determine the employee’s 
immigration status in the face of the CALRB complaint was a separate 
unfair labor practice under state law.41 
The issue of employer inquiries into immigration status during 
enforcement proceedings is unresolved in the federal private sector 
labor law context as well. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that an employer’s call to immigration authorities in retaliation for 
collective activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act 
 
 39 Cal. Artichoke & Vegetable Corp., 41 A.L.R.B. No. 2, 27-28 (2015). 
 40 Id. at 1. 
 41 Id. at 27-28. 
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(NLRA) can constitute an unfair labor practice. In its Sure-Tan v. 
NLRB decision, the Court, in 1984, concluded that the employer 
violated the NLRA because his call to immigration authorities was an 
act of retaliation in response to the employees’ protected concerted 
activities.42 Since then, the prosecutorial arm of the NLRB has also 
enforced the NLRA in the face of employer threats to call immigration 
in retaliation for employee engagement in protected concerted 
activity.43 Moreover, it has suggested that it may be an NLRA violation 
when the employer’s inquiries into immigration status are “for 
purposes of harassing the employee,” but the NLRB has not fully 
adjudicated the issue to date.44 In situations involving other federal 
employment law protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, courts have often limited immigration 
status inquiries during discovery to avoid creating a “chilling effect”45 
on employee plaintiffs.46 
 
 42 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 894-96 (1984); see also 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(3) (2012) (stating that it is an unfair labor practice if an employer 
discriminates “in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization”). 
 43 See Laura D. Francis, Immigrant Workers Claim Retaliation, Seek Executive Action 
to Prevent More, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 4, 2014, at A6, Bloomberg BNA No. 149 
(reporting an NLRB regional director alleged that a D.C.-area construction contractor 
threatened immigration-related retaliation if immigrant workers voted in favor of a 
union); see also Memorandum OM 11-62 from NLRB Assoc. Gen. Counsel to All Reg’l 
Dirs., Officers in Charge, and Resident Officers (June 7, 2011) (noting that U and T 
visas are sometimes available for immigrant workers when employers engage in 
“egregious conduct” such as “interfering with protected activity through illegal threats 
of retaliation such as threats to call immigration authorities”). 
 44 Memorandum OM 12-55 from NLRB Assoc. Gen. Counsel to All Reg’l Dirs., 
Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers (May 4, 2012) (“Regions may consider 
whether a charged party commits an independent violation of Section 8(a)(1) where, 
without evidence . . . it issues Board subpoenas for the employee’s work authorization 
documents for purposes of harassing the employee.”); see also Flaum Appetizing 
Corp., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 162, at 5 (Dec. 30, 2011) (concluding that employers cannot 
engage in an immigration status “fishing expedition” during proceedings and must 
plead specific facts about immigration status).  
 45 Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding the 
district court’s protective order against immigration status discovery as “justified 
because the substantial and particularized harm of the discovery — the chilling effect 
that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ immigration status could have upon their ability to 
effectuate their rights — outweighed [employer’s] interests in obtaining the 
information”).  
 46 In a study of decisions from 2002 to 2012 that considered immigration law 
effects on FLSA and Title VII claims (among others), Professor LeRoy finds that most 
courts have denied discovery into immigration status during court proceedings. See 
Michael H. LeRoy, Remedies for Unlawful Alien Workers: One Law for the Native and for 
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Thus, the precise open implied obstacle preemption question here is 
whether a CALRB’s finding — either to disregard the relevance of a 
worker’s immigration status or to find that the employer’s attempts to 
discover immigration status were retaliatory — would stand as an 
obstacle to federal immigration law. 
II. THE IMPLIED OBSTACLE PREEMPTION FRAMEWORK 
Recall that in the implied obstacle preemption context, federal law 
will preempt state regulatory action when the state’s actions are an 
obstacle to Congress’ objectives.47 There are two inquiries that inform 
this preemption analysis. To what extent is the presumption against 
preemption of state law operating? And, if the presumption is 
operating, is the tension between state and federal law significant 
enough to overcome the presumption? 
It is widely acknowledged that when states are acting out of their 
historic police powers, courts must employ a presumption against 
federal law preemption of state law. In regards to police power, the 
Court has noted that states have “great latitude” when they are 
legislating to protect “the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all 
persons.”48 In these circumstances, Congress’ intent to supersede these 
state regulations must be “clear and manifest” for preemption to 
occur.49 Thus, in the absence of a clear intent expressed by federal law, 
courts should presume that the state regulation is constitutional.50 
While some scholars critique the presumption against preemption for 
 
the Stranger Who Resides in Your Midst? An Empirical Perspective, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
623, 646-48 (2014) (citing relevant cases). 
 47 E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 48 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Altria 
Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76-77 (2008); Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 456-57 (2016) (“This general police power permits states to 
legislate, and sometimes litigate, on behalf of the safety and health of those within its 
borders.”). 
 49 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012). 
 50 See id. 
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its jurisprudential inconsistencies,51 the Court undoubtedly commonly 
embraces it as a central canon of statutory construction.52 
Once it has been established that the state is truly acting out of a 
historic police power interest, there is more to the inquiry. It is also 
important to gauge the depth of the state’s interest in a particular area. 
As the strength of the state interest increases, the strength of the 
presumption against preemption increases. Actually, the Court has 
impliedly acknowledged this spectrum, sometimes referring to a 
“strong” presumption against preemption.53 Thus, Part III considers 
the strength of California’s interest to regulate in ways that reduce 
immigration status effects on state provided workplace rights. 
Even when the presumption against preemption is operating, the 
question still remains whether the federal law’s intent to preempt is so 
clear that we can imply federal preemption of state authority. 
Determining whether Congress’ intent to preempt is “manifest” is a 
difficult question to answer when we are looking at what the federal 
government’s statutory scheme is implying. To figure this out in the 
obstacle preemption context, the Court tells us to consider the 
statutory language as well as other indicators of a statute’s “purpose 
and intended effects.”54 
Beyond this, however, in obstacle preemption cases, we should also 
inquire about the severity of potential tensions between federal and 
state law. Some scholars have contended that deciphering 
Congressional intent can be elusive when a statute is silent on an issue 
and have called for a focus on federal–state law tension rather than 
federal intent. Thomas Merrill, for instance, stresses that the inquiry 
should focus on whether the tensions between federal and state 
authority are “sufficiently severe to warrant the displacement of state 
law in light of all relevant factors that bear on this decision.”55 
 
 51 See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 
2092 (2000) (critiquing that as a matter of constitutional structure, there should be no 
presumption against or in favor or preemption); Robert N. Weiner, The Height of 
Presumption: Preemption and the Role of Courts, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 727, 727 (2009) 
(critiquing case law on the presumption against preemption as “contradictory and 
convoluted”). 
 52 See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 
(1996); Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279, 305 (D. N.H. 2009).  
 53 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992); see also Richmond Boro 
Gun Club, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 97 F.3d 681, 687 (2d Cir. 1996) (referring to a “strong 
presumption” against preemption). 
 54 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
 55 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 
743 (2008). 
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A focus on the severity of tension is consistent with Court cases that 
have asserted that speculative obstacles between federal and state law 
are not sufficient to merit preemption. In English v. General Electric 
Co., for example, the Court found that the argument that a state tort 
remedy would work against federal interests to have people move 
forward expediently in cases under the federal nuclear safety whistle 
blower law was “too speculative.”56 Similarly, in Hillsborough County v. 
Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. the Court concluded that if the 
effects of the state law on federal law are not direct or substantial, 
preemption is not warranted.57 Part IV will use both the intent and 
tension analytical lenses to consider the degree of conflict between the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act and California’s initiatives to 
reduce immigration status effects. 
III. THE STRENGTH OF CALIFORNIA’S POLICE POWERS 
A. State Employment Laws Emanate from Police Powers 
California’s interest in reducing immigration status effects on state-
provided workplace protections undoubtedly emanates from its 
historic police powers’ interest in regulating employment. 
It is uncontroversial that state employment regulations spring from 
historic police powers. In 1911, the Court described the police power 
function to regulate employment relations in the following manner: 
In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the 
[state] legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in 
order that there may be suitable protection of health and 
safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted 
through regulations designed to insure wholesome conditions 
of work and freedom from oppression.58 
Courts have even characterized state employment laws that touch 
upon immigration status issues as emanating from states’ police 
powers authority. In its 1976 De Canas decision, the Court concluded 
that a state law that imposed sanctions on employers who employed 
unauthorized immigrants was squarely within the state’s “broad 
authority . . . to regulate the employment relationship to protect 
 
 56 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1990). 
 57 See Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721-22 
(1985). 
 58 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 570 (1911); see 
also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937). 
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workers within the State.”59 Even though IRCA now explicitly 
preempts De Canas-style state employer sanctions laws,60 the Court 
still cites De Canas to make the general proclamation that employment 
regulations emanate from the states’ historic police powers even if they 
relate to immigration.61 
Similarly, the Court’s 2012 Arizona v. United States decision 
characterized Arizona’s misdemeanor for unauthorized work as 
touching upon the state’s historic police powers to regulate 
employment, even though one of the goals was to reduce 
unauthorized immigration.62 Recently, the Ninth Circuit characterized 
Arizona’s identity theft regulations in the employment arena as 
regulations that “have effects in the area of immigration” but that have 
police power connections.63 
Given that state employment initiatives aimed at reducing illegal 
immigration emanate from a state’s historic police powers, California’s 
initiatives to reduce immigration status effects on state-provided 
worker rights squarely fall within its police power authority over 
employment regulation. A state’s rationale in this context is that when 
unauthorized workers have fewer protections than their authorized 
counterparts, working conditions for everyone in the state are 
threatened. 
The remaining subsections of this part illustrate the depth of 
California’s police powers interest, and thus the power of the 
presumption, in the particular circumstances at issue in this article. In 
the last two decades, California has exhibited a strong interest in 
reducing immigration status effects on state-provided worker 
protections in general. Since the enactment of CALRA in 1975, 
California has also demonstrated a committed interest in regulating 
 
 59 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (“States possess broad authority 
under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers 
within the State. Child labor laws, minimum and other wage laws, laws affecting 
occupational health and safety, and workmen’s compensation laws are only a few 
examples.”).  
 60 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503-04 (2012). 
 61 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2503; Chamber of Commerce of 
the U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 588 (2011). 
 62 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2497, 2503 (quoting purpose of Arizona 
law as intended to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens 
and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States”). 
 63 Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2016). It rejected a facial 
challenge to the law but is likely to face continued Supremacy Clause challenges 
moving forward. See Laura D. Francis, Immigrants Vie to Reinstate Ban on Arizona ID 
Theft Laws, DAILY LAB. REP., May 17, 2016, at A-4, Bloomberg BNA No. 95. 
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agricultural labor relations in particular, due to the history of labor 
relations in California and the federal government’s decision to 
affirmatively put the regulation of agricultural relations in the hands of 
the states. 
B. The State’s Interest in Reducing Immigration Status Effects on 
Worker Rights 
California’s interest in reducing the negative effects of immigration 
status on worker protections is consistent with a growing literature 
exposing the negative effects of restrictive immigration measures on 
worker protections for authorized and unauthorized workers alike. 
California has addressed immigration status effects through its 2002 
law enacted in the wake of Hoffman and its 2013 immigration-
retaliation protections, both referenced above. 
Various scholars have illuminated the ways that the exclusionary 
aspects of federal immigration law64 have had negative effects on 
employees’ collective activity and workplace protections.65 
Unauthorized immigrant workers occupy a contradictory and 
somewhat confusing legal terrain that inhibits their ability to fully take 
advantage of worker protections. On the one hand, unauthorized 
immigrant workers have not been granted permission to be legally 
present in the United States under federal immigration law. On the 
other hand, they are in the U.S. and are providing labor to U.S. 
employers. The act of providing labor gives rise to employer 
obligations and protections for workers as workers. 
Some employers exploit this “legal limbo” to intimidate 
unauthorized workers who seek to improve their working conditions. 
Other times, even when employers do not use immigration status as a 
stick to intimidate, workers often fear that coming forward to their 
 
 64 Leticia Saucedo’s work helpfully reminds us that exclusion of some individuals 
is only one principle of immigration law. Other aspects of our immigration regime 
promote humanitarian principles. See, e.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration 
Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in 
the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303 (2010). 
 65 For a discussion and cited sources regarding immigration law’s effects on 
workplace protections, see, for example, Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: 
Crossing the Borders of Immigration and Workplace Law, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
611, 630-35 (2012). See also Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of 
Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 
594 (2010) (contending that unauthorized immigration status reduces the likelihood 
that a worker will make a claim regarding workplace rights because of fears of 
deportation, a short-term view of a worker’s employment experience in the U.S. and a 
hesitance to rock the boat because the workplace is a place of “belonging” in the U.S). 
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employer or to a government agency. They fear that seeking to redress 
workplace grievances might make them — or their family members — 
vulnerable to immigration law repercussions.66 Kathleen Kim has 
declared that immigration policies that criminalize workers foster 
conditions for “workplace coercion” which lead to “workplace 
exploitation.”67 
Scholars also contend that unauthorized status foments a constant 
fear of deportation, producing a chilling effect on workers’ reporting 
of wage violations and workplace threats to their health and personal 
safety.68 Unauthorized immigrant workers undoubtedly tend to 
experience lower labor standards than their authorized counterparts. 
Empirical analyses from the Legalized Population Survey69 and other 
studies illustrate that unauthorized immigrants receive lower wages, 
experience working conditions that are more dangerous, and suffer 
higher incidences of workplace violations.70 
Consistent with these views, California made its first major 
legislative attempt to reduce immigration status effects on state-
provided worker rights in 2002. In the wake of the Court’s Hoffman 
decision, California passed a law which explicitly made “immigration 
status irrelevant for the enforcement of state labor, employment, civil 
rights and employee housing laws.”71 This state law, sometimes 
colloquially referred to as the “Hoffman fix” law, clarified that 
remedies under state law, such as backpay, should be provided 
 
 66 See Leticia M. Saucedo & Maria Cristina Morales, Voices Without Law: The 
Border Crossing Stories and Workplace Attitudes of Immigrants, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 641, 657 (2012). 
 67 Kathleen Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558, 1561-62 (2015). 
 68 See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Anticipatory Retaliation, Threats, and the 
Silencing of the Brown Collar Workforce, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 779-86 (2013); Gleeson, 
supra note 65, at 594.  
 69 See Sherrie A. Kossoudji & Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, Coming out of the Shadows: 
Learning About Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Population, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 
598, 622-24 (2002). 
 70 See, e.g., ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: 
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009); Matthew Hall 
& Emily Greenman, The Occupational Cost of Being Illegal in the United States: Legal 
Status, Job Hazards, and Compensating Differentials, 49 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 406, 431 
(2015); Matthew Hall, Emily Greenman & George Farkas, Legal Status and Wage 
Disparities for Mexican Immigrants, 89 SOC. FORCES 491, 499-502 (2010). 
 71 Maria Pabon Lopez, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United States 
Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and Comparison with 
Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 332 (2005) (referring to 
S.B. 1818, which was codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3339 (2016)). 
  
2017] The Power of a Presumption 1299 
regardless of immigration status.72 Further, the bill prohibited inquiry 
into a person’s immigration status in proceedings to enforce state laws, 
except where there is “clear and convincing evidence” that the inquiry 
regarding immigration is necessary under federal immigration law.73 
The legislative history behind this state enactment reveals that 
California passed the bill in response to fears and widespread 
reporting that employer responses to the Hoffman decision would 
negatively affect California’s ability to enforce the protections it 
provides to workers within the state.74 
In October 2013, California legislated again to reduce the perceived 
negative effects of immigration status on the enforcement of state-
provided worker rights. These series of provisions show California’s 
interest in ensuring that workers report concerns about workplace 
rights violations without fear of retaliation or employer intimidation 
through the use of immigration-related threats.75 The legislative 
history of California’s 2013 immigration retaliation laws shows that 
the state recognized the significant labor force participation of 
immigrants76 — especially in the low-wage labor market77 — and was 
 
 72 See SENATE THIRD READING, S.B. 1818, 2001–2002 Reg. Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2002). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. at 1, 3; S. RULES COMM., SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 1818, 2001–2002 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); ASSEMB. COMM. ON LABOR & EMP’T, ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE 
ANALYSIS, S.B. 1818, 2001–2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); S. COMM. ON LABOR & INDUS. 
RELATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, S.B. 1818, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). For 
various reports about Hoffman’s negative effects, which were cited in the legislative 
history, see Nancy Cleeland, Employers Test Ruling on Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 
2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/22/business/fi-workers22. 
 75 See 2013 Cal. Stat. ch. 732, §1(e)–(j). These bills were A.B. 263, A.B. 524, and 
S.B. 666. These new laws provide California workers who seek to exercise their 
workplace rights with strengthened protections against employer retaliation, including 
specific protections for immigrant workers. The laws went into effect on January 1, 
2014. S.B. 666 adds section 244 to the Labor Code, adds sections 494.6 and 6103.7 to 
the Business and Professions Code (B&P), and amends sections 98.6 and 1102.5 of 
the Labor Code. A.B. 263 (which has a few identical provisions to S.B. 666) adds 
section 1019 to the Labor Code. 
 76 See S. RULES COMM., SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 666, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 
6 (Cal. 2013) (noting the 2.6 million unauthorized immigrants and that one-fourth of 
the unauthorized population nationwide resides in California). 
 77 Id. (noting that most unauthorized immigrants work in low-wage jobs in 
agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and service industries where they are at 
greater risk of exploitation and violations of the workplace rights). The analysis drew 
from a study of low-wage work in Los Angeles. This study showed that more than 75 
percent of unauthorized workers had worked without being paid and 85 percent did 
not receive overtime pay in the previous week. RUTH MILKMAN ET AL., WAGE THEFT AND 
WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS IN LOS ANGELES: THE FAILURE OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 
FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS 45, 48 tbl.7 (2010), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/ 
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concerned about reports that immigration status was impeding the 
enforcement of state-provided workplace protections.78 
Specifically, California’s protections from immigration retaliation 
provided for the suspension of business licenses for employers who 
threaten to report the immigration status of a worker or the worker’s 
family members in retaliation for the worker’s attempt to exercise his 
or her workplace rights.79 According to the law, exercising workplace 
rights includes the filing of a complaint, informing others about 
workplace rights or seeking information about an employer’s 
compliance with state-provided workplace protections.80 It also made 
it an “unfair immigration-related practice” for an employer to request 
documentation that goes beyond what is required by federal law.81 
 
5jt7n9gx#page-1. 
 78 See S. RULES COMM., SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 666, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 
7. Moreover, the author of the bill expressed its purpose to empower workers to 
exercise their rights without fear of immigration status retaliation. SENATE THIRD 
READING, S.B. 666, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal. 2013). 
 79 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 494.6 (West 2016) (stating a business license may be 
subject to suspension if the employer violates § 244 of the Labor Code). Under 
California Labor Code section 244(b), the report or a threat to report an employee’s 
citizenship or immigration status or that of a family member because the employee 
has exercised a right under the California Labor Code is prohibited. CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 244(b) (West 2016). A court may order the suspension of an employer’s business 
license if it is found to have engaged in a retaliatory “unfair immigration-related 
practice” against a person exercising a right protected under the California Labor 
Code or a local workplace ordinance. Id. § 1019 (West 2016). 
 80 Id. § 1019(a)(1)-(3) (West 2016). 
 81 See id. It builds in a presumption that an employer violates the provision if it takes 
this act within 90 days of the worker’s exercise of his or her rights. Id. § 1019(c) (West 
2016). An employee or other person subject to an unfair immigration-related practice 
may bring a civil action for equitable relief and any damages and penalties, and may 
recover attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. § 1019(d)(1) (West 2016). In addition, S.B. 666 
includes discipline for attorneys who threaten to report immigrant workers involved in an 
administrative or civil employment suit. An attorney may be disciplined, suspended, or 
disbarred by the California State Bar if he or she reports or threatens to report the 
suspected immigration status of an individual (or family member) or a witness in an 
administrative or a civil proceeding because the individual has exercised a right related to 
employment. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6103.7 (West 2016). There is also California 
Labor Code section 1024.6, which prohibits an employer from retaliating against or 
terminating an employee that updates his or her “personal information,” unless the 
changes are directly related to skill set, qualification or knowledge required for the job. 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.6 (West 2016). The statute appears to be “intended to prevent 
employers from discharging employees who update their immigration status, including 
social security numbers but it is not clear whether it also prohibits an employer from 
discharging the employee for originally providing false information.” Erin Holyoke, 
California Supreme Court Allows Undocumented Workers to Recover Damages in 
Discrimination Cases, NIXON PEABODY (July 21, 2014), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/ 
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California’s deep public policy interest in reducing the effects of 
immigration status on state-provided workplace protections is also 
evidenced by the criminal provisions that California added to the 2013 
immigration retaliation laws.82 Threats to report immigration status in 
order to obtain property may constitute criminal extortion in serious 
cases.83 Given that the law is relatively new, it is not clear yet how it 
may apply to an employer’s private inquiries into immigration status 
during proceedings to enforce state workplace protections. In Cal. 
Artichoke and Vegetable Corp. v. Hernandez, referenced in Part I, the 
CALRB noted in dicta that the employer’s hiring of a private 
investigator to discover immigration status may violate California’s 
immigration retaliation law, but did not rule on the issue.84 
California’s interest in reducing immigration status effects in the 
CALRA context are particularly compelling given the legacy of 
CALRA. Even though many referred to CALRA as La Esperanza de 
California (the Hope of California) when California enacted it in 1975, 
it has not led to widespread worker organizing or unionization in 
California’s agricultural sector. Moreover, many farmworkers still face 
extremely challenging working conditions due to such things as long 
hours, low wages, unpaid wages for work they perform, sexual 
harassment and assault, pesticide exposure and other health and safety 
concerns on California’s farms.85 
 
undocumented_workers_may_recover_back_pay_damages.  
 82 Criminalizing behavior illustrates deep public interest. The Court has 
acknowledged that criminal as well as civil enforcement measures can highlight the 
“private–public character” of a right. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 709-
10 (1945). 
 83 AB 524 clarifies that a threat to report any individual’s immigration status or 
suspected immigration status in order to obtain his or her property may constitute 
criminal extortion. CAL. PENAL CODE § 519 (West 2016) (codified from Assemb. B. 
524 (Cal. 2013)). The penalty for criminal extortion is imprisonment of up to one 
year and/or a fine of up to $10,000. Id. § 524. Extortion is the obtaining of property 
from another person, with his or her consent, through the use of wrongful force or 
fear. Id. § 518.  
 84 Cal. Artichoke & Vegetable Corp., 41 A.L.R.B. No. 2, 26-28 (2015).  
 85 See, e.g., Bristol–Myers Squibb Foundation Awards Eight Grants Totaling Nearly 
$11.5M to Make Lung and Skin Cancer Screening, Care More Accessible in High-Risk U.S. 
Communities, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 
20160201005019/en/ (“Although farmworkers in the U.S. are exposed to living and 
working conditions that double their risk of developing melanoma and other skin cancers, 
access to skin cancer prevention, screening and specialty care and services are difficult to 
obtain.”); California’s Working Poor Grow Poorer, PASADENA STAR NEWS (Dec. 18, 2015, 
10:47:18), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/s/news/1f5938b95e7d2355776d7c48117ae731/ 
document/O0UJUUAIH8N6?headlineOnly=false&highlight=california+AND+%28farmwor
ker+OR+%26quot%3Bfarm+worker%26quot%3B%29+AND+organiz%2; Alex Darocy, 
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Scholars and commentators have put forth a variety of theories to 
explain why worker organizing is so scarce and union density is so 
low in California’s agricultural sector. These theories include high 
turnover rates on farms, low investment and decisions of unions in 
organizing this sector86 and changes in the make-up of the agricultural 
sector, such as a move away from direct employment, that make it 
 
Community Members in Watsonville Demonstrate in Support of Driscoll’s Berry Boycott, SANTA 
CRUZ INDYMEDIA (Jan. 3, 2016, 8:16 PM), https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2016/01/03/ 
18781454.php; Robert Digitale, Sonoma County Business Leaders Told Economy is ‘Vibrant,’ 
as Protesters Disagree, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/ 
home/5136958-181/sonoma-county-business-leaders-told?artslide=0; Julie Fidler, 
Agricultural Workers Diagnosed with Cancer Sue Monsanto, NAT. SOC’Y (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://naturalsociety.com/u-s-agricultural-workers-diagnosed-with-cancer-sue-monsanto; 
Paul Koberstein, EPA Mulls Ban on Nation’s Most Heavily Used Insecticide, SALON (Jan. 30, 
2016, 12:00 PM PDT), http://www.salon.com/2016/01/30/why_the_potential_epa_ban_ 
on_the_nations_most_heavily_used_insecticide_pins_farmers_between_a_rock_and_a_har
d_place_partner/ (documenting farmworker exposure to insecticides); Anna Lappé & 
Joanna Lo, The Best Way to Give Thanks? How About a Raise?, TIME (Nov. 26, 2015), 
http://time.com/4122947/the-best-way-to-give-thanks-how-about-a-raise/ (“It’s not just 
poor wages; it’s also dangerous working conditions. Workers on conventional farms are 
exposed to a barrage of toxic chemicals, many of which have been associated with a variety 
of cancers and hormonal and neurological problems. Studies published by the California 
Cancer Registry have found that farmworkers have higher risks of lymphomas and 
leukemia, as well as brain, stomach, prostate and cervical cancers.”); Esther Yu Hsi Lee, A 
Whole Lot of California Farmworkers Are Landing in the Hospital. Why?, THINK PROGRESS 
(Sept. 3, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2015/09/03/3697705/temperatures-
rise-farmworkers-heat-illness/; Cora Lewis, Child Farmworkers Banned from Handling 
Pesticides, But Not Tobacco, BUZZFEED (Sept. 28, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
coralewis/child-farmworkers-banned-from-handling-pesticides#.xawzPNjD6; Tracie 
McMillan, Activists Demand a Bill of Rights For California Farm Workers, N.P.R. (Jan. 29, 
2016, 11:35 AM EST), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/01/29/464758284/ 
activists-demand-a-bill-of-rights-for-california-farm-workers (noting concerns about 
payment of wages, sexual harassment and violence, the need for rest breaks, and health 
risks due to pesticide exposure and other dangers); Sonia Narang, Why Are Kids Going 
Hungry in One of California’s Most Productive Farming Regions?, P.R.I. (Jan. 28, 2016, 8:30 
AM EST), http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-01-28/why-are-kids-going-hungry-one-
california-s-most-productive-farming-regions; José R. Padilla & David Bacon, Protect 
Female Farmworkers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/ 
opinion/how-to-protect-female-farmworkers.html?emc=edit_tnt_20160119&nlid= 
67410322&tntemail0=y&_r=1; Claire Simonich, Your Vegetables Are Grown by Exploited 
Labor, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
claire-simonich/your-vegetables-are-grown_b_8016312.html. 
 86 See, e.g., Matt Garcia, Cesar Chavez and the United Farmworkers Movement, in 
OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA 1, 14 (2016); Jennifer Gordon, A Movement in the 
Wake of a New Law: The United Farm Workers and the California Agricultural Labor 
Relations Act, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 277, 277-79 (Austin Sarat & 
Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006); Miriam J. Wells & Don Villarejo, State Structures and 
Social Movement Strategies: The Shaping of Farm Labor Protections in California, 32 POL. 
& SOC’Y 291 (2004). 
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more difficult to challenge the large food brands that drive the bulk of 
California’s agricultural industry. 
Philip Martin has persuasively argued that one of the primary, and 
too-often underappreciated, reasons that CALRA has not lived up to 
its potential as the Hope of California is due to the significant presence 
of the unauthorized immigrant workforce in the agricultural industry. 
The precarious nature of the unauthorized workforce over the last 
four decades has challenged organizing efforts.87 Thus, California’s 
police powers’ interest in regulating agricultural labor relations in 
ways that reduce negative effects of unauthorized immigration status 
on CALRA’s protections for worker organizing efforts is particularly 
salient. 
C. The State’s Interest in Regulating Agricultural Labor Relations 
California also has a strong police power interest to regulate 
California’s agricultural labor relations in ways that reduce inequalities 
of bargaining power between employers and employees and in ways 
that ameliorate disruptive conflict between employers and employees 
in this sector. Recently, on September 12, 2016, Governor Brown 
signed legislation granting agricultural laborers the right to receive 
overtime premiums on the wages they receive when they work more 
than forty hours in one week.88 As this subsection will illustrate, this 
recent change in California’s overtime law echoes California’s 
attempts, with CALRA, to provide rights to agricultural laborers that 
are comparable to workers’ rights in other sectors. 
As CALRA’s language states, in 1975 it became “the policy of the 
State of California” not only to “protect” but also “to encourage” 
California’s farmworkers’ “full freedom of association.”89 This meant 
that the legislation needed to help keep them “free from the 
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers . . . [when engaging 
in] concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.”90 
This statement of policy, along with executive branch, legislative 
history and court interpretations of the need for CALRA illustrate 
 
 87 See PHILIP MARTIN, IMPORTING POVERTY? IMMIGRATION AND THE CHANGING FACE 
OF RURAL AMERICA 36-39 (2009). 
 88 See Laura Mahoney, California Overtime Bill for Agricultural Workers Becomes 
Law, DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 12, 2016, at A-9, Bloomberg BNA No. 176 (referring to 
Assemb. B. 1066). 
 89 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140.2 (West 2016). 
 90 Id.  
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California’s strong police power interests in regulating California’s 
agricultural labor relations. Moreover, soon after Californians elected 
Jerry Brown as their governor for the first time, he dedicated part of 
his January 6, 1975 inaugural address to the need for a farmworker 
relations bill in California.91 
CALRA arose out of California’s concern about farmworkers who 
had been left out of the NLRA’s protections of collective activity in the 
workplace. It also emerged in response to concerns with rising 
tensions between growers and farmworkers and jurisdictional disputes 
between unions interested in organizing this sector. 
CALRA exemplified a state’s attempt to fill the gap left by the 
NLRA’s exclusion of agricultural laborers. Herman Levy, one of the 
main architects of CALRA, noted that CALRA was the state’s attempt 
to fill the NLRA’s void.92 California courts have often acknowledged 
that the state legislature explicitly intended to fill the hole left by the 
NLRA.93 In a similar vein, at a May 12, 1975 hearing to consider the 
proposed bill (which would later become CALRA), one of the bill’s 
drafters, Howard Berman, described the purpose of the bill as “an 
effort to correct an [egregious] omission of 40 years standing.”94 
 
 91 See Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown, Governor of Cal., First Inaugural Address (Jan. 
6, 1975), http://governors.library.ca.gov/addresses/34-Jbrown01.html (“And while we 
remove the special privileges of the few, we should not overlook the sacrifices of the 
many. It is time that we treat all workers alike, whether they work in the city or toil in 
the fields . . . I also believe it is time to extend the rule of law to the agriculture sector 
and establish the right of secret ballot elections for farm workers. The law I support 
will impose rights and responsibilities on both farm worker and farmer alike. I expect 
that an appropriate bill that serves all the people will not fully satisfy any of the parties 
to the dispute, but that’s no reason not to pass it.”). 
 92 See Levy, supra note 17, at 783-85. 
 93 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (2012); id. § 152(3); Pasillas v. Agric. Labor Relations 
Bd., 202 Cal. Rptr. 739, 745 (1984); see also CAL. LAB. CODE Div. 2, Pt. 3.5, Ch. 1 note 
(2017) (Legislative Intent); Tex-Cal Land Mgmt., Inc. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 
595 P.2d 579, 584 (Cal. 1979) (noting that ALRA “is designed to provide agricultural 
workers with protection of their collective bargaining rights comparable to that 
provided nonagricultural workers by the NLRA[,]” and that “the ALRA was patterned 
after the NLRA, with changes necessary to meet special needs of California 
agriculture.”). 
 94 Hearing on A.B. 1533 Before Assemb. Comm. on Labor Relations, 1975 Leg., 3d 
Ex. Sess. 2 (Cal. 1975) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman, Co-Author, CALRA). He 
went on to state: 
In 1935, the Congress excluded agricultural workers from the protection of 
the National Labor Relations Act. As a result, farm workers in contrast to 
nearly every other employee in the private sector have been unable to use 
existing federal machinery to enforce their rights to bargain collectively, to 
obtain secret ballot elections, and to receive protection from interference and 
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California also had a strong interest in legislating in this area 
because labor relations had become extremely disruptive in the 1960s 
and 1970s. As the Los Angeles Times reported in 1975, CALRA was 
“designed to end 10 years of turmoil” in California’s agriculture 
industry.95 In the early 1970s, a bitter dispute erupted between the 
United Farm Workers (UFW) and the Teamsters, two unions 
interested in representing California’s farmworkers for collective 
bargaining purposes.96 
The UFW’s inspirational leader, Cesar Chavez, believed that 
contracts between growers and the Teamsters in the early 1970s97 had 
been “sweetheart” agreements that did not give workers the 
opportunity to choose their own representation.98 In February and 
March 1975, the UFW called public attention to the need for 
legislation in this area99 when it engaged in a successful 110-mile 
march from San Francisco to the E & J Gallo Winery in Modesto, 
California.100 By the time the marchers reached Modesto on March 1, 
more than 15,000 people had joined the march.101 The bill was 
introduced on April 10, 1975 and the governor signed it into law on 
June 4, 1975.102 
The legislative history of the proposed bill, which eventually became 
CALRA, illustrates California’s police powers interest in bringing labor 
relations peace to California’s agricultural sector.103 Senator John 
 
coercion by either employers or unions in the free selection of a bargaining 
representative.  
Id. 
 95 Jerry Gilliam, Assembly Sends Farm Bill to Brown for Signing, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 
1975, at B1. 
 96 See Harry Bernstein, Teamsters President Proposes Alliance with Growers Group, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1972, at A1; Harry Bernstein, Teamsters to Seek New Farm Pacts: 
Chavez Fight Seen, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1972, at A3; Teamsters End a Truce with 
Chavez’s United Farm Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1972, at 33; Teamsters Gain 
California Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1973, at 40; Frank Del Olmo, Teamsters Sign 
First Grape Pacts: Chavez Boycott Looms, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1973, at A1.  
 97 See Frank Del Olmo, Chavez Forces Gather for Rally: Demonstrators at Gallo Aim 
for Farm Labor Law, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1975, at 3. 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See id.; Frank Del Olmo, Chavez Union Marches to Back Winery Boycott, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1975, at C1. 
 102 See Governor Signs Historic Farm Labor Legislation, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1975 at 
A3; Sweeping Farm Labor Bill Introduced in Sacramento, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1975 at 3. 
 103 Rose Bird, California Secretary of Agriculture, for instance, noted that the bill 
“is an attempt to resolve a potentially volatile situation and to bring legitimacy, due 
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Dunlap, co-Author of CALRA, stated that California was attempting 
“to establish some initial ground rules to cover a situation of unrest 
that’s existed for many years.”104 In a similar vein, when describing 
why he voted in favor of the legislation, Member Gordon Duffy 
expressed some urgency about legislating to “resolve the problem of 
employer–employee relationships in agriculture.”105 
While CALRA was modeled after the NLRA, California intentionally 
included special features to address the particular nature of 
California’s agricultural sector. California courts have often 
acknowledged that the state legislature explicitly adapted it to the 
unique nature of the state’s agricultural context.106 For instance, 
because of the jurisdictional disputes between the UFW and the 
Teamsters and allegations that some Teamsters unions were essentially 
company unions, California required designation of collective 
bargaining representatives solely through secret ballot election.107 This 
 
process, and fair play to the agricultural fields of California.” Hearing on AB 1533 
Before Assemb. Comm. on Labor Relations, 1975 Leg., 3d Ex. Sess. 4 (Cal. 1975) 
(statement of Rose Bird, Sec., Cal. Dept. of Agric.). 
 104 Hearing on S. Bill 1 Before the S. Indus. Labor Relations Comm., 1975 Leg., 3d 
Extraordinary Sess. 40 (Cal. 1975) (statement of Sen. Dunlap, Co-Author, CALRA). 
 105 ASSEMB. JOURNAL, 3d Extraordinary Sess., at 31 (Cal. 1975), http://clerk. 
assembly.ca.gov/sites/clerk.assembly.ca.gov/files/archive/DailyJournal/1975/Volumes/7
56133e.pdf. Moreover, during the November 1975 hearings reviewing the Act’s early 
implementation Chairman of the CALRB, Bishop Roger Mahony, reminded legislators 
of the purposes underlying CALRA. He noted that California is “truly in a transitional 
period — a time of moving away from ten years of bitterness, conflict and deep 
polarization to a new era of improved labor relations in our State’s agricultural 
industry. . . . The new law attempted to bridge the three-way cross fire with which we 
were all familiar. The law, with its strengths and weaknesses, sought to fill a vast void 
where no law or regulation had ever before existed.” Review of the Implementation of 
the Alatorre–Zenovich–Dunlap–Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975: Joint 
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indus. Relations and Assemb. Comm. on Labor Relations, 
1975 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1, at 4 (Cal. 1975) (statement of Bishop Roger Mahony, 
Chairman, Agric. Labor Relations Bd.). 
 106 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (excluding agricultural laborer under the 
definition of ‘employee’); Pasillas v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 202 Cal. Rptr. 739, 
745 (1984); see also CAL. LAB. CODE Div. 2, Pt. 3.5, Ch. 1 note (2017) (Legislative 
Intent); Tex-Cal Land Mgmt., Inc. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 595 P.2d 579, 584 
(Cal. 1979) (noting that ALRA “is designed to provide agricultural workers with 
protection of their collective bargaining rights comparable to that provided 
nonagricultural workers by the NLRA[,]” and that “the ALRA was patterned after the 
NLRA, with changes necessary to meet special needs of California agriculture.”). 
 107 For instance, referring to this aspect of CALRA, Secretary Bird stated that “it 
was a strong feeling . . . that if you were going to bring some kind of resolution to the 
question of legitimacy, that if you allowed the employer to trigger the election 
mechanism, there would always be raised the question of whether or not he coerced 
the employees and forced an election upon employees in some way.” Hearing on S. Bill 
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is unlike the NLRA, which allows employers to voluntarily recognize a 
collective bargaining representative through a showing of majority 
status via authorization cards.108 
Another special feature of agricultural relations that California 
acknowledged was the high mobility of this workforce. Given the 
nature of farming, farmworkers often move from farm to farm, making 
it difficult to determine which employees are eligible to vote in a 
union representation election in some contexts.109 In the May 21, 1975 
hearing, for example, committee members and interested parties 
discussed this issue.110 Republican Senators and those representing 
growers’ interests were concerned that the migratory nature of farm 
work would allow workers who were not truly a part of the bargaining 
unit to vote.111 In response, Secretary Bird retorted that the CALRB 
was set up to be an expert in this area and its members are “going to 
recognize the specific needs of agriculture.”112 
 
1 Before the S. Indus. Labor Relations Comm., 1975 Leg., 3d Extraordinary Sess. 51 
(Cal. 1975) (statement of Rose Bird, Sec., Cal. Dept. of Agric.). 
 108 See NLRB. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969). 
 109 CALRA legislators also modeled the legislation to acknowledge the extreme 
variation in the workforce depending on the harvest season. For instance, during a 
May 27, 1975 hearing Senator Dunlap explained that election petitions may only be 
filed when the number of employees is more than 50% of “peak employment,” which 
is the time of year when the most employees are working. Hearing on S. Bill 1 Before 
the S. Ways & Means Comm. 1975 Leg., 3d Extraordinary Sess. 23-24 (Cal. 1975) 
(statement of Sen. Berman quoting California Labor Code sections 1156.3(a)(1), 
1156.4, “in this connection peak agricultural employment for the prior season shall 
alone not be basis for such determination, but rather the Board shall estimate peak 
employment on the basis of acreage and crop statistics which shall be applied 
uniformly throughout the state of California and upon all other relevant data”). 
 110 See Hearing on S. Bill 1 Before the S. Indus. Labor Relations Comm., 1975 Leg., 3d 
Extraordinary Sess. 11-36 (Cal. 1975). 
 111 See id. at 26. 
 112 Secretary Bird also said, “we can sit here all day and conjure up all sorts of scare 
stories about who is going to be able to vote and who is not going to be able to vote. 
We have five reasonable people sitting on that board who recognize that in agriculture 
we’re dealing with a different industry than we are, perhaps, in the automobile 
industry.” Id. at 29-30 (statement of Rose Bird, Sec., Cal. Dept. of Agric.); see also 
Hearing on S. Bill 1 Before the S. Ways & Means Comm., 1975 Leg. 3d. Extraordinary 
Sess.16 (statement of Sec. Bird quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 1153(c)) (Cal. 1975) 
(responding to Assemblyman Z’berg’s question about whether farmworkers need to 
pay union dues at two farms by calling attention to Section 1153(c) of the bill, which 
states “[n]o employee who has been required to pay dues to a labor organization by 
virtue of his employment as an agricultural worker during any calendar month, shall 
be required to pay dues to another labor organization by virtue of similar employment 
during such month”). These questions about voter eligibility continued after the 
enactment of CALRA. In November 1975 the Senate Committee on Industrial 
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Unauthorized immigrant farmworkers were explicitly discussed very 
minimally. During the November 1975 hearings reviewing CALRA’s 
early implementation, Assembly Member Kenneth L. Maddy suggested 
that CALRA should be amended to prohibit unauthorized workers 
from voting for or against a labor union.113 This suggested amendment 
did not receive traction with the other legislators. As part of the 
proceedings, the CALRB defended its ruling that unauthorized 
workers can vote if they are “employees” under CALRA. Chairman of 
the CALRB, Bishop Roger Mahony explained that the CALRB’s 
position was that “if they’re on the payroll period, they meet the 
qualification [to vote].”114 He went on to note that “as long as these 
are farm workers out there who wish to express a view on joining a 
union or not, and they’re employees, it seems to be that they should be 
allowed to vote and participate.”115 The CALRB’s General Counsel 
made a similar argument, pointing out that figuring out a worker’s 
immigration status is “an extremely complex question” and noting 
that a state labor relations agency is not “equipped as a forum to make 
that determination.” Instead, the agency can and should consider who 
 
Relations and the Assembly Committee on Labor Relations held a hearing to address 
the “confusion” and “serious problems” evident in the first months of operation of 
CALRA. Review of the Implementation of the Alatorre–Zenovich–Dunlap–Berman 
Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975: Joint Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indus. 
Relations and Assemb. Comm. on Labor Relations, 1975 Leg., Reg. Sess.1, at 1 (Cal. 
1975) (statement of Sen. George N. Zenovich, Chairman of Joint Hearing and Co-
Author of CALRA). The committee expressed a concern that some of the workers 
petitioning for representation elections were not employees of that farm. Review of the 
Implementation of the Alatorre–Zenovich–Dunlap–Berman Agricultural Labor Relations 
Act of 1975: Joint Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indus. Relations and Assemb. Comm. on 
Labor Relations, 1975 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2, at 258 (Cal. 1975). Regional Director of the 
CALRB Fresno office acknowledged the challenges and noted that one of the 
difficulties is due to the role of labor contractors as intermediaries between 
farmworkers and growers. He noted that sometimes growers call the regional office 
and say “[l]isten, I don’t know who is working here but my contractor is so and so.” 
Id. at 280. He went on to suggest that the CALRB works with the contractors, who are 
required to keep records, in these cases to help sort out any confusion.  
 113 See Review of the Implementation of the Alatorre–Zenovich–Dunlap–Berman 
Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975: Joint Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indus. 
Relations and Assemb. Comm. on Labor Relations, 1975 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1, at 34-35 (Cal. 
1975) (statement of Assemb. Kenneth L. Maddy, Member, Assemb. Comm. on Labor 
Relations). 
 114 Id. at 35 (statement of Bishop Roger Mahony, Chairman, Agric. Labor Relations 
Bd.).  
 115 Id.  
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is an “employee” and adjudicate the rights that emanate from that 
designation.116 
In conclusion, the context giving rise to CALRA illustrates the 
state’s deep interest in reducing inequalities of bargaining power and 
disruptive conflict in the agricultural sector. 
D. Exclusion from Federal Protection Amplifies State Interest 
Federal exclusion from collective action rights is another indicator 
of California’s strong police power interest in regulating California’s 
agricultural labor relations in ways that reduce inequalities of 
bargaining power. 
In 1935, the U.S. Congress affirmatively put the regulation of 
farmworker organizing in the hands of the states. While there are a 
number of theories for why the federal government excluded 
agricultural workers from the National Labor Relation Act’s (NLRA’s) 
protections in 1935, including racism and political pragmatism to get 
the bill passed, the reasons stated in the NLRA’s legislative history had 
to do with concerns about regional variation in the size and nature of 
the agricultural sector. Even if the “real reason” farmworkers were 
excluded was for political expediency reasons (to get Southern 
legislators to sign onto the bill), in the author’s view that is just 
further justification for giving the states’ wide police powers latitude to 
provide rights to this vulnerable sector of workers. 
While the Court and commentators have often noted the extreme 
breadth of the NLRA’s preemption of subfederal initiatives in the area 
of labor relations,117 the NLRA does not preempt state-level regulation 
of farmworker organizing. Congress affirmatively put the regulation of 
farmworker organizing in the hands of the states. On its face, the 
NLRA’s definition of “employee” excludes “any individual employed 
as an agricultural laborer,” among other categories of workers.118 
 
 116 Id. at 112 (statement of Walter Kintz, General Counsel, Agric. Labor Relations 
Bd.).  
 117 See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 
132, 149 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 
(1959); see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and 
States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (2011) (“It would be difficult to find a regime of 
federal preemption broader than the one grounded in the . . . (NLRA).”). See generally 
Kati L. Griffith, The NLRA Defamation Defense: Doomed Dinosaur or Diamond in the 
Rough?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 32-37 (2009). 
 118 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). Indeed, the NLRB describes agricultural laborers as 
one of the groups that are excluded from NLRB jurisdiction. See Jurisdictional 
Standards, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/jurisdictional-standards (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2016) (“The following employers are excluded from NLRB 
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When Congress intended to leave excluded groups free of subfederal 
regulation, it said so explicitly. Section 14(a) of the NLRA states that 
employers subject to the NLRA should not be compelled to deem 
supervisors (another group explicitly excluded from the NLRA’s 
definition of employee) “as employees for the purpose of any law, 
either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.”119 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has interpreted Section 14(a) to restrict state 
governments from providing supervisors with collective activity 
rights.120 
There is no such prohibitory language with respect to the 
agricultural exclusion in the NLRA’s language. As the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit characterized it, “[w]e find nothing in 
the [NLRA] to suggest that Congress intended to preempt such state 
action by legislating for the entire field. Indeed, we draw precisely the 
opposite inference from Congress’s exclusion of agricultural 
employees from the Act.”121 
Moreover, the reports, debates and hearings that make up the 
NLRA’s legislative history support the notion that Congress intended 
to leave the regulation of farmworker organizing to the states. The 
author’s comprehensive review of the NLRA’s legislative history 
revealed that regulation of collective activity among agricultural 
laborers was not a salient federal interest for the New Deal legislators 
who considered the legislation. 
Instead, the NLRA’s legislative history starkly illustrates that the 
federal legislative authority that passed the NLRA was motivated by 
the plight of industrial workers, barely mentioning agricultural 
laborers.122 As a Minnesota federal district court observed in the 
 
jurisdiction . . . [e]mployers who employ only agricultural laborers.”). 
 119 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2012).  
 120 See Hanna Mining Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, 382 U.S. 181, 
189-90 (1965) (interpreting section 14(a) as explicitly preempting state laws that 
protect collective activity among supervisors). States can, however, restrict collective 
activity among supervisors. Beasley v. Food Fair of N.C., Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 657-62 
(1974) (interpreting section 14(a) as allowing states to restrict collective activity 
among supervisors). 
 121 United Farm Workers v. Ariz. Agric. Emp’t Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1257 
(9th Cir. 1982); see also NLRB v. Comm. of Interns & Residents, 566 F.2d 810, 815 
n.5 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that NLRA exclusion of agricultural workers provides 
states with rights to regulate in this area); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Jones, 430 F. Supp. 
573, 578 (D. Minn. 1977) (stating the same); United Farm Workers Org. Comm. v. 
Super. Ct. of Monterey Cty., 483 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) (indicating 
that state regulation of agricultural workers’ collective activity is not preempted).  
 122 See Karen S. Koziara, Collective Bargaining in Agriculture: The Policy Alternatives, 
24 LAB. L. J. 424, 425-26 (1973); LeRoy, supra note 46 (describing paucity of 
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1970s, the “paucity” of NLRA legislative history on the agricultural 
exclusion communicates that “neither Congress nor virtually anyone 
else was much concerned with the problems of agricultural labor.”123 
It then concluded that the NLRA Congress intended to let Minnesota 
and the other states regulate agricultural worker collective activity in 
any ways they saw fit within their police power authority.124 
Despite the paucity, the NLRA’s legislative history illustrates that the 
stated reasons for excluding agriculture were that this was an area of 
regulation better left to the states. Admittedly, the reasons legislators 
vocalize might not be the “real reasons” they voted in favor of a bill. 
Many scholars have made compelling arguments that the exclusion of 
agriculture had more to do with racism125 or political pragmatism 
(winning support from Southern Democrats for New Deal legislation) 
than anything else.126 
Nonetheless, as Justice Breyer has said, the “personal motives” of 
legislators “do not change the purpose of the bill’s language.”127 As a 
 
legislative history on agricultural workers); Austin P. Morris, Agricultural Labor and 
National Labor Legislation, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1939, 1951-56 (1966) (describing the 
same).  
 123 Willmar Poultry Co., 430 F. Supp. at 578; see Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, 
Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights for “Dependent Contractors,” 
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 162, 164-65 (2005) (citing Willmar Poultry Co., 430 
F. Supp. at 576, and stating that agriculture is one of those “situations involving local 
regulations that ‘touch and concern’ the complex employment relationship” and are 
thus left in the hands of the states); see also Alan Hyde, Who Speaks for the Working 
Poor?: A Preliminary Look at the Emerging Tetralogy of Representation of Low-Wage 
Service Workers, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 612 n.67 (2004) (“The exclusion 
of agricultural workers from the NLRA permits states to regulate their collective labor 
activity. . . . States, by contrast, are not permitted to regulate the collective labor 
activity of groups as to which Congress or one of its designated agencies has 
affirmatively desired an unregulated labor market, such as supervisors.”).  
 124 See Willmar Poultry Co., 430 F. Supp. at 578. 
 125 See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of 
the Agricultural and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 
72 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 98 (2011) (“[S]outhern congressmen wanted to exclude black 
employees from the New Deal to preserve the quasi-plantation style of agriculture that 
pervaded the still-segregated Jim Crow South.”). 
 126 See CAROLINE FREDERICKSON, UNDER THE BUS: HOW WORKING WOMEN ARE BEING 
RUN OVER 21 (2015); see also IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 
59 (2005) (“It is not hard to see why southern members were so intensely concerned 
with [the agricultural exclusion] . . . . The status of subaltern black labor in 
agriculture — a structure that often came close to resembling nineteenth-century 
conditions under slavery — was a consistent concern for southern members in the 
1930s . . . .”). 
 127 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845, 865-66 (1992). 
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matter of legal analysis, we can work with the stated purposes found 
in the legislative history to gain insight into a statute’s meaning.128 
Moreover, even if a salient motivator was to allay Southern legislator 
fears that African American farmworkers and domestic workers would 
organize against employer interests or to bow to powerful growers in 
California,129 that motivation is just further support for the notion that 
states’ police powers to protect workers who labor within their borders 
are implicated. 
The original bill, introduced by Senator Wagner in March of 1934, 
did not exclude agricultural laborers.130 Once the bill was reported out 
of committee a few months later, however, the exclusion of 
agricultural laborers appeared.131 The only insight that can be gleaned 
from a report on the legislation came in May of 1935, which stated 
that the committee had exempted agricultural labor “for 
administrative reasons.”132 
Some dialogue from the debates and hearings suggests that one of 
these administrative reasons might have been due to variation in the 
agricultural sector across the states, which made it a difficult area for 
federal regulation. In a June 19, 1935 debate, Congressman Boileau 
from Wisconsin noted that the vast majority of farms in the Middle 
West “are smaller and more or less a family affair.”133 As a result, 
 
 128 See Kati L. Griffith, When Federal Immigration Exclusion Meets Subfederal 
Workplace Inclusion: A Forensic Approach to Legislative History, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 881, 894 (2014) [hereinafter Immigration Exclusion] (“As Justice Breyer has 
stated, the ‘personal motives’ of legislators ‘do not change the purpose of the bill’s 
language.’ Even if an individual legislator votes for a bill because he or she is beholden 
to a powerful interest group and solely intends to please that group, the bill 
nonetheless carries with it legislative purposes that must be interpreted and carried 
forth within our legal system.”). 
 129 See Victoria V. Johnson, Note, Did Old MacDonald Have a Farm?: Holly Farms 
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 295 n.7 (1998) 
(stating that “the strength of the agricultural lobby” was one reason explaining the 
exclusion). 
 130 Labor Disputes Act, S. 2926, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 1 (1949) (“[T]he 
term ‘employee’ . . . shall not be limited to mean the employee of a particular 
employer . . . unless the Act explicitly states otherwise.”); Labor Disputes Act, H.R. 
8423, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 1128 (1949) (stating the same). 
 131 See S. REP. No. 73-1184, at 1 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 1099 (1949). 
 132 S. REP. No. 74-573, at 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 2306 (1949). 
 133 79 CONG. REC. 9721 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 3203 (1949). 
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Boileau concluded that “[t]he agricultural worker is not a problem in 
some of the states.”134 
Testimony at the hearings on the legislation by farmer advocates 
echoed the concern about vast regional variation in the situation of 
agriculture, and the prevalence of small farmers. A representative of a 
national farmer organization, the National Grange, reported that there 
were “protests from various parts of the country” about the inclusion 
of agriculture in the NLRA because most farmers are small farmers and 
farm size and dynamics “vary wildly” across the country.135 
Congressman Vito Marcantonio, a legislator representing Manhattan 
NY, was the lone legislative voice on behalf of agricultural workers’ 
organizing rights at the time. Marcantonio proposed an amendment to 
the NLRA in June 1935 to remove the exclusion for agricultural 
laborers, which did not pass.136 In his view, agricultural laborers 
experienced the “worst conditions”137 and were organizing against 
“the most outrageous exploitation in America.”138 He cited child labor 
concerns in the beet-sugar fields, which the National Child Labor 
Committee had brought to light, the “reign of terror” and extreme 
intimidation by growers in California’s Imperial Valley, the “terribly 
exploited” farmworkers in Ohio’s Hardin County as well as the 
suffering of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU) in 
Arkansas.139 
As a result, Marcantonio repeatedly implored his fellow legislators 
to accept that there “is not a single solitary reason” to exclude 
agricultural workers from this bill.140 Marcantonio’s proposed 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 To Create a National Labor Board: Hearing on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 73d Cong. 1000 (1934) (statement of representative of the National 
Grange). See generally id. at 340 (statement of the National Manufacturers Association 
opposing the bill and arguing that it is too broad and would sweep up farms). 
 136 79 CONG. REC. 9,720 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 3201 (1949) (stating, in the June 19, 1935 
debate, that “[i]t is a matter of plain fact that the worst conditions” are suffered by 
agricultural workers). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 3202. 
 139 Id. at 3201. For Marcantonio, the STFU’s experience was the “most conclusive 
proof” that agricultural laborers should be included within the NLRA’s protective 
umbrella. He noted that even though the STFU had used peaceful tactics and made 
“reasonable” demands, armed grower representatives were patrolling the streets and 
union organizers were experiencing physical assaults and threats of lynching.  
 140 Id. He also attached a minority view to several NLRA reports, which laid out his 
disagreement about excluding agricultural laborers. H.R. REP. NO. 74-1147, at 26-30 
(1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 1935, at 
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amendment to remove the exclusion of farmworkers from collective 
action rights was easily voted down. Representative Connery, one of 
the bill’s sponsors responded to this proposed amendment with 
pragmatism. He persuasively said to his fellow legislators that the 
agricultural exclusion had been considered carefully by the committee 
and that he believed “in biting off one mouthful at a time,” noting that 
there would be a future opportunity “to take care of the agricultural 
workers.”141 
In the hearings associated with the NLRA there were no witnesses 
who explicitly represented farmworkers or their interests. There were 
two witnesses, however, who contended that the agricultural 
exclusion should only apply to small farms. At the first hearing, 
William Morris Leiserson, an economics professor and New Deal 
Administrator who later served as a Member of the National Labor 
Relations Board, testified that it made sense to exempt small farmers, 
but not to exempt industrial agriculture like what was common in 
California’s Imperial Valley at the time.142 
In one of the later hearings, a long testimony by a journalist, James 
Rorty, also made the argument that agricultural laborers should not be 
excluded from the NLRA when “the type of agriculture is a highly 
industrial type of agriculture”.143 He had spent some time in the 
Imperial Valley reporting on a lettuce strike. He noted the “difficulties 
arising from alien labor” and the difficulty that “Mexican field 
workers” in particular had maintaining “a decent existence.”144 
 
3077-82 (1949); H.R. REP. NO. 74-972, at 24-28 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative 
History of the National Labor Relations Act 1935, at 2979-84 (1949); H.R. REP. NO. 
74-969, at 24-28 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the National Labor 
Relations Act 1935, at 2933-37 (1949). 
 141 79 CONG. REC. 9, 721 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the National 
Labor Relations Act 1935, at 3202 (1949). Representatives Boileau and Knutson 
verbally rejected the amendment. Id. 
 142 To Create a National Labor Board: Hearing on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 73d Cong. 239 (1934). 
 143 Labor Disputes Act: Hearing on H.R. 6288 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 74th 
Cong. 38 (1935) (statement of James Rorty, newspaper correspondent). 
 144 Id. at 35 (referencing Glassford report); cf. LeRoy & Hendricks, Should 
“Agricultural Laborers” Continue to be Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 
48 EMORY L. J. 489, 506 (1999) (“On June 23, the Committee received a report from 
Pelham D. Glassford, special conciliator for the Imperial, California Board of 
Supervisors. His report urged enactment of public policies to provide farm 
workers . . . greater protection from exploitation. Although Glassford’s report became 
part of the Committee’s record, no one followed-up on its findings or 
recommendations. Instead, the Senate Committee’s attention was diverted to the 
apparent influence that large growers used in having county sheriffs intimidate pesky 
news reporters and union sympathizers.”). 
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Worker complaints included lost wages, long hours and child labor.145 
He also noted that farmworkers’ rights to engage in collective activities 
are “completely abrogated in the valley.”146 
The NLRA’s exclusion and legislative history strongly suggests that 
Congress affirmatively left the regulation of agricultural relations in 
the hands of the states. All of the subsections of this part have shown 
the depth of the state’s interest in this area. Thus, a strong 
presumption against federal preemption of state regulatory efforts is 
operating. In the next part, the article considers whether the tension 
between federal and state law is sufficient to overcome this 
presumption against preemption. 
IV. THE WEAKNESS OF THE FEDERAL–STATE TENSION 
IRCA’s text is silent on the question of its intended effects on labor 
and employment law protections for unauthorized employees at the 
federal and state levels. The reason some assert that Congress did 
intend to preempt some state labor and employment law protections is 
that IRCA’s underlying philosophy is to curb unauthorized 
immigration by making it more difficult for unauthorized immigrants 
to gain employment in the United States.147 According to this logic, 
one way to reduce the attractiveness of jobs in the United States (the 
magnet) would be to limit the labor and employment law protections 
unauthorized immigrant workers enjoy once they are here. 
This argument, however, is undercut by a careful obstacle 
preemption analysis. As this Part will illuminate, IRCA’s plain 
language, Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, and IRCA’s legislative 
history reveal that a state’s provision of labor and employment law 
protections to unauthorized immigrant workers is not in tension with 
 
 145 Labor Disputes Act: Hearing on H.R. 6288 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 74th 
Cong. 43 (1935). 
 146 Id. at 40. He also recounted a story of an organizing effort among Mexican field 
workers that had experienced a “very aggressive, terroristic campaign” by growers 
which resulted in arrests of the union organizers and the end of the organizing 
campaign. Id. at 44-45 (stating that there are many unauthorized Mexican 
farmworkers and that “most of the forces of law are completely in the hands of the 
growers”); id. at 46 (stating that the AFL thinks it is “impossible” to organize field 
workers in the Imperial Valley but the conditions were “so abominable that they did 
take an interest in that” and stating that the arrest and jailing of AFL organizers “has 
broken many a strike, and that is exactly what it did to the Mexican field workers in 
Imperial last year and in San Joaquin Valley”). 
 147 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012); see also Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). 
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IRCA’s purposes or enforcement mechanisms. If there is any tension, 
it is weak at best. 
A. IRCA’s Plain Language and Supremacy Clause Jurisprudence 
IRCA’s plain language communicates that the main thrust of the 
regulation is on employer behavior, rather than employee behavior.148 
IRCA sanctions employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized 
immigrants and requires that employers verify the work authorization 
status of its employees. 
Moreover, IRCA’s section 111(d) communicates that protections for 
unauthorized employees are in line with IRCA’s goals. This section 
provided funds to the U.S. Department of Labor to enforce wage and 
hour law on behalf of unauthorized immigrant employees “in order to 
deter the employment of unauthorized aliens and remove the 
economic incentive for employers to exploit and use such aliens.”149 
This provision does not explicitly state IRCA will not affect any state 
labor and employment law protection provided to unauthorized 
employees. It does, however, show a federal legislative policy decision 
to enforce wage and hour law on behalf of unauthorized employees as 
a way to remove employers’ economic incentives to prefer 
unauthorized employees over authorized employees. 
The Court’s Arizona v. United States150 decision further reveals that 
Congress intended to direct the majority of its enforcement machinery 
on employer behavior and that it was concerned about abuses against 
unauthorized workers. In an effort to reduce unauthorized 
immigration and the perceived problems it creates, in 2010 Arizona 
enacted a law which made it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien 
to work or solicit work.151 This aspect of the law, along with others, 
was challenged primarily on Supremacy Clause grounds.152 The Court 
concluded that federal immigration law (IRCA) preempted this aspect 
of Arizona’s law.153 
 
 148 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650 (“This legislation seeks to close the back door on 
illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigration may remain open. The 
principal meaning of closing the back door, or curtailing future illegal immigration, is 
through employer sanctions.”). 
 149 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 111(d), 100 Stat. 3359, 3381. 
 150 132 S. Ct. at 2504.  
 151 Id. at 2503. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 2505.  
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The Court’s analysis highlighted that Arizona’s misdemeanor for 
unauthorized work was in direct tension with IRCA’s purposes and 
enforcement mechanisms. The Court reasoned that Congress, through 
IRCA’s workplace-based enforcement scheme, intended to regulate 
immigration primarily through verification requirements and 
employer sanctions for hiring unauthorized immigrants. Congress also 
intended some civil sanctions against unauthorized immigrants, which 
it enumerated in the statute.154 It did not intend to place criminal 
sanctions on unauthorized immigrants for engaging in work.155 Doing 
so, the Court added, would criminalize people “who already face the 
possibility of employer exploitation because of their removable status” 
and thus “would be inconsistent with federal policy and objectives.”156 
Similarly, state-level identity laws that criminalize unauthorized 
immigrants for using false documents to gain employment are also 
treading in unconstitutional waters. Leticia Saucedo persuasively 
maintains that this is the case because the federal government’s 
workplace immigration enforcement is primarily focused on 
“disincentivizing the employer preference for undocumented workers 
rather than placing the blame on the workers who are drawn into the 
migration stream.”157 
B. IRCA’s Legislative History 
IRCA’s legislative history suggests that state efforts to reduce 
immigration status effects on workplace rights are consistent with 
IRCA’s purpose to reduce employer incentives to prefer unauthorized 
workers over authorized workers and to reduce the exploitation of 
unauthorized workers. 
The author’s comprehensive and systematic review of thousands of 
pages of IRCA’s legislative history (1972–1986)158 illustrated that the 
 
 154 Id. at 2504 (“Under federal law some civil penalties are imposed instead. With 
certain exceptions, aliens who accept unlawful employment are not eligible to have 
their status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. . . . Aliens also may be 
removed from the country for having engaged in unauthorized work . . . In addition to 
specifying these civil consequences, federal law makes it a crime for unauthorized 
workers to obtain employment through fraudulent means . . . Congress has made 
clear, however, that any information employees submit to indicate their work status 
“may not be used” for purposes other than prosecution under specified federal 
criminal statutes for fraud, perjury, and related conduct . . . .”). 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. 
 157 Saucedo, “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 6, at 1507-08. 
 158 See generally Griffith, Immigration Exclusion, supra note 128. 
  
1318 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:1279 
primary focus was on altering employer behavior. When legislators 
considered how the legislation would affect “incentives,” they focused 
on curbing employer incentives to prefer unauthorized workers over 
authorized workers. The review also showed that concerns about the 
working conditions of authorized and unauthorized workers were 
central throughout IRCA’s fifteen-year long legislative history. 
Congress’ view was that “full workplace protections for 
unauthorized workers would disincentivize employers from hiring 
unauthorized employees” more than it would incentivize 
unauthorized immigrants to immigrate to the United States.159 Of the 
thirteen reports included in IRCA’s legislative history, eight mentioned 
incentives in relationship to unauthorized immigrant workers’ 
workplace protections somewhere in the report. All eight of these 
reports project the view that the provision of workplace protections to 
unauthorized immigrant workers helpfully disincentivizes employers 
from preferring them over authorized workers.160 IRCA’s final 
conference report in 1986 stated that money was going to the U.S. 
Department of Labor to “deter the employment of unauthorized aliens 
and remove the economic incentive for employers to exploit and use 
such aliens.”161 
The legislative history also communicates Congressional intent to 
allow federal and state workers’ rights agencies to work on behalf of 
unauthorized immigrant workers. A 1986 House Report stated that the 
committee did not intend that IRCA “would limit the powers of” 
worker rights agencies “to remedy unfair practices committed against 
undocumented employees for exercising their rights.”162 It went on to 
say that limiting these agencies’ ability to remedy workplace law 
violations “would be counter-productive of our intent to limit the 
hiring of undocumented employees.”163 
The Hoffman Court dismissed this report as a “slender reed” of 
legislative intent.164 That said, because Hoffman was not an implied 
 
 159 Id. at 914.  
 160 Id. at 915 n.111 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-1000, at 25 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-
682, at 106 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 98-115, at 37 (1983); S. REP. No. 98-62, at 22, 120 
(1983); H.R. REP. No. 97-890, at 195 (1982); S. REP. No. 97-485, at 120 (1982); STAFF 
OF S. AND H.R. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND 
THE NAT’L INTEREST 344 (J. Comm. Print 1981); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF OF 
SELECT COMM’N OF IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 96TH CONG., TEMPORARY WORKER 
PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, at 134 (Comm. Print 1980)). 
 161 Id., n.112 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-1000, at 25 (1986)). 
 162 Id., n.113 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986)). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 n.4 (2002). 
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conflict preemption case it did not comprehensively review IRCA’s 
legislative history and did not view the issue under the more deferential 
analytical lens necessary when a state’s police powers are implicated. 
Once we view this report “in the context of a long line of reports that 
echo this sentiment” we see consistent emphasis on the preservation of 
labor and employment law protections for unauthorized employees.165 
No report suggested that workplace protections for the unauthorized 
workforce would hurt IRCA’s policy goals by providing incentives for 
immigrants to violate immigration law. 
Labor concerns and concerns about mistreatment of unauthorized 
immigrant workers are central features of IRCA’s legislative history. 
All thirteen reports on the legislation between 1973 and 1986 that 
discussed IRCA’s purposes cited labor concerns as one of the primary 
motivators of the legislation.166 While most of the emphasis focused 
on the working conditions of authorized workers, due to the presence 
of unauthorized workers (driving down labor standards), almost all of 
them also expressed concern about unauthorized workers’ working 
conditions. As one report described it: 
Undocumented/illegal migrants, at the mercy of unscrupulous 
employers and ‘coyotes’ who smuggle them across the border, 
cannot and will not avail themselves of the protection of U.S. 
laws. . . . The presence of a substantial number of 
undocumented/illegal aliens in the United States has 
resulted . . . in the breaking of minimum wage and 
occupational safety laws.167 
Eleven of the thirteen reports went so far as to describe the working 
conditions of unauthorized immigrant workers as “exploitation.”168 
 
 165 Griffith, Immigration Exclusion, supra note 128, at 915 & n.114, 916 nn.115–17 
(quoting one report and citing six congressional reports spanning 1981-1983). 
 166 Id. at 909 & n.97 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 49 (1986); H.R. REP. 
No. 99-1000 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-132, at 1 (1985); S. REP. No. 98-62, at 1 (1983); 
H.R. REP. No. 98-115, pt. 1, at 30 (1983); S. REP. No. 97-485, at 1 (1982); H.R. REP. 
No. 97-890,pt. 1, at 29 (1982); STAFF OF S. AND H.R. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH 
CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION POL’Y AND THE NAT’L INTEREST (J. Comm. Print 1981); STAFF 
OF SELECT COMM’N OF IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POL’Y, 97TH CONG., SEMIANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONG. (J. Comm. Print 1981); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF OF SELECT 
COMM’N OF IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POL’Y, 96TH CONG., TEMPORARY WORKER 
PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (Comm. Print 1980); H.R. REP. No. 96-1301, at 11, 
23 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at 2 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 93-108, at 3 (1973)). 
 167 Id. at 909 & n.98 (quoting STAFF OF S. AND H.R. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH 
CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION POL’Y AND THE NAT’L INTEREST 42 (J. Comm. Print 1981)).  
 168 Id. at 910 & n.99 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-115, pt.1, at 37 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 
97-890, pt. 1, at 193 (1982); STAFF OF S. AND H.R. COMMS. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH 
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Federal legislators often explicitly connected the concern for 
unauthorized immigrant workers with the effects they had on the 
working conditions and wages of authorized workers.169 In this way, 
they acknowledged that some employers might prefer unauthorized 
workers because they had fewer protections as employees. Three of the 
Senate Reports that were released in the years immediately preceding 
IRCA’s enactment (1982, 1983, and 1985) discussed how 
unauthorized immigrant workers bring down wages and working 
conditions for authorized workers because of their “weak bargaining 
position,” which makes them “a fearful and clearly exploitable 
group.”170 
It was not just the reports associated with IRCA that showed this 
underlying intent. Comments in the legislative debates 
overwhelmingly showed that concerns about labor conditions were a 
prime motivator. Legislators who sponsored or introduced the bill, for 
instance, consistently stated that labor concerns were a main purpose 
of the legislation.171 Ninety percent of all legislators that spoke about 
the purposes of the bill on a given date of debate mentioned labor 
concerns as a driving policy concern behind IRCA.172 
Given this overwhelming sentiment in IRCA’s legislative history it is 
hard to believe that Congress clearly and manifestly intended to 
preempt states from reducing immigration status effects on state-
provided workplace rights in the circumstances at issue in this article. 
Even if IRCA’s structure and legislative history could be viewed as 
standing for the proposition that state labor and employment law 
protections might conflict with federal immigration policy goals, this 
conflict is not direct enough to merit preemption in a context that 
requires a strong presumption against preemption. A finding of 
preemption would require a conclusion that providing unauthorized 
 
CONG., U.S. IMMIGRATION POL’Y AND THE NAT’L INTEREST 13 (J. Comm. Print 1981); 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STAFF OF SELECT COMM’N OF IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POL’Y, 
96TH CONG., TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 109 (Comm. 
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immigrant workers with state labor and employment law protections 
will increase unauthorized immigration to the U.S. — a very 
speculative inferential leap. 
CONCLUSION 
California is taking leadership as a laboratory for policy 
experimentation related to unauthorized immigrant workers’ rights. 
No other state, to date, has advanced comparable policy initiatives in 
this area. Justice Brandeis famously stated that “one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system” is that “a single courageous State, 
may . . . try novel social and economic experiments.”173 Importantly, 
however, Brandeis saw this role as legitimate when there was no “risk 
to the rest of the country.”174 In other words, this laboratory role is 
possible when the state’s acts are independent and, in the words of 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, do not create “negative externalities.”175 
As this article has argued, California’s attempts to reduce immigration 
status effects on state-provided workplace protections do not create 
risks for other states or for the federal government’s immigration 
policy goals. 
Given the long stalemate on immigration legislative initiatives at the 
federal level, states should (as a policy matter) and can (as a 
constitutional matter) play a key role in serving as laboratories for 
immigrant workers rights in the age of immployment law. The growing 
area of research showing the negative effects of immigration status on 
workplace rights suggests that there are compelling policy reasons for 
states to regulate to reduce immigration status effects on worker 
protections. Moreover, as this article has elaborated upon, it is within 
a state’s constitutional authority to reduce immigration status effects 
through (a) providing employees with full backpay remedies where 
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appropriate and (b) limiting employer inquiries into immigration 
status in the midst of state workplace law enforcement when federal 
law does not require these inquiries. 
